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"Although police may examine the exterior 
of a vehicle parked in a public place, the 
attaching of a directional 'beeper' to the 
vehicle without a search warrant is unlawful ... 
unless it is done in emergency circumstances 
and with probable cause." 
Robert H. Cureton 
Judge of Oconee County 
Civil - Criminal -Family Court 
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DUI. .. 
PREVIOUS CHARGE PENDING 
Many times a DUI defendant will be arrested 
and it will be found that there is a previous 
charge against him that has not been handled. The 
defendant has been summoned to appear before a 
magistrate or municipal court. Must the arresting 
officer proceed at the time and on the date set by 
the officer on the uniform traffic ticket? 
EX PARTE SARVIS 
(SC ... Filed 12-30-75) 
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently held 
that a reasonable delay in bringing a second DUI 
charge to trial so that disposition of a first 
charge could be determined was not prejudicial to 
the defendant. 
The language of the Court follows: 
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DELAY IN TRYING SECOND Clli\RGE 
"The only request by respondent was that his 
case be tried in Magistrate's court. He has not 
sought a speedy trial in any other court. In view 
of respondent's prior conviction for a first offense, 
the Magistrate's Court had no jurisdiction to grant 
respondent's request. In substance, the contention 
of respondent is that he was entitled to have the 
second charge against him tried in Magistrate's Court 
as a first offense while the appeal from the first 
offense conviction was pending. If this had been 
done and respondent had been convicted on the second 
charge, he would have had two convictions for first 
offense charges of driving under the influence, since 
his first conviction was affirmed. 
It is apparent that the main cause of delay in 
disposing of the second charge against respondent 
was the appeal from the conviction for the first 
offense. The delay, resulting from such appeal, in 
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order to determine the appropriate court in which to 
try the second charge, was reasonable and necessary 
and deprived respondent of no constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. Respondent's right to a speedy 
trial did not give him the right to insist that he be 
given a speedy trial in a court without jurisdiction 
to try the offense. 
The controlling considerations when dealing with 
a defendant's right to a speedy trial have been set 
forth in State v. Foster, 260 S.C. 511, 197 S.E. (2d) 
280. One of the important factors is that of pre-
judice to the defendant from the delay. 
The only prejudice claimed, or found by the 
lower court, was that, by waiting until the appeal 
from the conviction for the first offense was 
affirmed by this Court, respondent's second charge 
was determined absolutely to be a second offense 
subjecting him to a charge of "a higher crime for 
which the punishment would be more severe". This 
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result is required by the law when a defendant is 
charged with multiple violations of the statute 
making it unlawful to drive while under the 
influence of intoxicants. The fact that for a 
second violation a defendant is charged with a 
second offense under the statute is the intent of 
the law and does not constitute legal prejudice." 
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~AWFUL WIRETAP 
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LAWFUL WIRETAP 
Recording of a telephone conversation is not 
unlawful when one party to the conversation consents 
to the tap •.• even when the consenting party is a 
police informer and the other party is unaware of 
the interception. This was recently restated by a 
United States Court of Appeals in a case entitled 
US v. Ransom, 515F2d885. 
One Puett was apprehended by police on a drug 
charge. He agreed to telephone his 'source' and 
arrange another buy. The call was tapped and 
recorded by police with the knowledge and consent 
of Puett. 
The source, Ransom, was arrested with a companion 
in his motor vehicle when he made the delivery. 
Amphetamines were delivered to Puett by Ransom, and, 
upon being told by Puett that the 'buy' had been 
made, police arrested Ransom and his passenger. 
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A pistol and a sawed-off shotgun were found under 
the front seat of the car. In addition to the drug 
charge, both were charged with unlawful possession 
of firearms. Officers took the car keys, unlocked 
the trunk and found heroin. The two were charged 
also with possession of heroin. 
Upon conviction, the defendants appealed, 
giving several arguments why their conviction was 
unlawful. Conviction was upheld for the reasons 
stated by the Court. 
) 
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ARGUMENT I 
The defendants argued that the wiretap of the 
telephone conversation between Puett and Ransom 
setting up the 'buy' was unlawful. Court ruling: 
"Ransom's argument that the interception was 
violative of federal wiretap law, namely Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, 18 U.S. C. §2510 et seq., is completely with-
out merit. There was ample evidence to support the 
conclusion that Puett consented to the interception, 
and 18 U.S. C. §2511(2) (c) provides explicitly that it 
is not unlawful under the Act "for a person acting 
under color of law to intercept a wire or oral 
communication, where such person is a party to the 
communication or one of the parties to the communi-
cation has given prior consent to such interception." 
SEE ALSO Ansley v. Stynchcombe, 480 F2d 437 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
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ARGUMENT II 
It was argued for the passenger that he could 
not be convicted of possession of the pistol and 
sawed-off shotgun since the only proof was that they 
belonged to the driver Ransom. The Court said: 
"Appellant DeMour claims that there was no 
evidence to connect him with receipt of the Browning 
automatic as charged in count three and the Smith & 
Wesson revolver as charged in count four. He submits 
that the government's evidence tended to show that 
co-defendant Ransom received the Browning pistol but 
argues that there was nothing to show that he also 
received the pistol. Likewise, he claims there was 
nothing to connect him with the Smith & Wesson 
Revolver. 18 U.S. C. App. §1202 (a) ( 1) makes it unlawful 
for a convicted felon to receive, possess, or trans-
port in commerce any firearm. There is ample evidence 
to support the conclusion that DeMour had, at least 
constructive possession of the pistols." 
/ 
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ARGUMENT III 
Both defendants argued th~t police made an 
unlawful arrest because they did not actually see 
the amphetamines passed, but relied on Puett's word 
as to what had happened. If the arrest was unlawful, 
the search of the car would have been unlawful. 
Refusing to accept this argument, the Court said: 
"Appellants Ransom and DeMour moved to suppress 
evidence obtained from the arrest and search and 
seizure. They argued that there was not sufficient 
probable cause to arrest without a warrant and claimed 
that the subsequent search and seizure was unlawful. 
The district court, finding sufficient probable cause 
for the arrests, denied the motion to suppress and 
appellants contend on appeal that this was error. 
Considering Puett's arrest bare ly two hours earlier 
and his statements implicating Ransom, the monitoring 
of the calls between Ransom and Puett, and the 
appearance of Ransom and DeMour shortly afterwards at 
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the trailer court parking lot, we think that there 
were ample grounds to believe Ransom and DeMour had 
been and were at that time committing violations of 
,l POLICE BEEPER 
the Georgia narcotics law. Moreover, at the time of J ON 
the arrest, Ransom and DeMour were leaving the scene. 
It would have been totally unreasonable to require SUSPECT VEHICLE 
the police officers to have obtained an arrest 
warrant in view of these circumstances. There was 
probable cause to arrest, and the search and seizure 
incident thereto did not violate the Fourth Amendment." 
~ 
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POLICE BEEPER needed for the purchase, other police officers 
ON SUSPECT VEHICLE attached a directional 'beeper' to the underside of 
(US v. Holmes, 521 F2d 859) 
the pusher's car, which was parked outside, Their 
purpose was to be able to ascertain the location of 
It had not been decided by a Federal Court until 
the suspect vehicle in the event visual surveillance 
recently, whether or not the placing of a directional 
failed. They had no search warrant, and there had 
'beeper' on a suspect vehicle by police constituted a 
been sufficient time in which to obtain one. 
'search' within the meaning of the constitutional 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The suspect vehicle was lost to visual 
surveillance, and directional finders located it 
The Federal Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 
with the aid of the 'beeper' within a hundred yards 
(New Orleans) has now held that such police activity 
of a rural residence near which was a wooden shed, 
does constitute a 'search' and that police need a 
search warrant or probable cause in emergency 
When the officers arrived at the scene, the 
circumstances in order to make it lawful. 
' suspect vehicle had gone. They looked into the shed 
through a large hole and saw marijuana. They then 
FACTS 
put out an APB to stop the suspect vehicle and 
search it for drugs. 
An undercover agent met a pusher in a lounge in 
Gainesville, Florida, to complete arrangements for a 
The suspect vehicle was spotted by other officers 
'buy' of marijuana. While the two were inside the 
on the highway, stopped, and searched. Twelve 
lounge, where the agent showed the $45,500 cash 
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hundred pounds of marijuana was found. The vehicle's 
two occupants were charged with possession with 
intent. Others at the residence were charged with 
possession with intent arising out of the marijuana 
found in the shed. 
Upon appeal from conviction, the defendant's 
questioned the right of the officers to attach a 
'beeper' to the suspect vehicle without a warrant and 
to go upon private property (within the curtilage) 
and look into the shed where marijuana was found. 
Court rulings on these questions: 
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INSTALLATION OF BEEPER 
"(1) We hold that the installation of an 
electronic tracking device on a motor vehicle is a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Although the government does not dispute that its 
agents were seeking to unearth evidence of crime and 
the identity of associates in crime for criminal 
prosecution, it argues that the installation was not 
a search because no privacy was invaded. In relies 
upon the Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United 
States, 1967, 389 U.S. 3L>7, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 2d 
576. Its premise is twofold: (1) that although a 
technical trespass was committed, a citizen can have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle 
left on a public parking lot with its exterior and 
much of its interior accessible to any passerby; and 
(2) that a citizen cannot reasonably expect his 
movements on public roads to remain private. 
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Each premise in the government's analysis is 
defective. We likewise turn initially to KATZ, 
supra, for its explication of Fourth Amendment 
application. Justice Stewart there noted that the 
Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy 
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, 
but its protections go further, and often have 
nothing to do with privacy at all." (Footnote 
omitted.) 389U.S. at350, 88S.Ct. at510, 19L.Ed.2d 
at 581. The location of the vehicle at the time of 
the installation is not controlling: 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis ~:. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424,427, 17 L.Ed. 
2d 312; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 
746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202. But what he seeks to preserve 
as private even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected. 389 U.S. at 351, 88 
S.Ct. at511, 19L.Ed.2dat582. 
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When a person parks his car on a public way, 
he does not thereby give up all expectations of 
privacy in his vehicle. There is a right to be 
secure, even in public. Certainly, the driver may 
not complain if police observe objects in plain 
view of the car. See, e.g., Marshall v. United 
States, 5 Cir. 1970, 422 F.2d 185. Nor may he 
complain if they search out his VIN, see n.9, supra, 
take a paint scraping, or compare tire treads for 
identification comparisons. These intrusions are of 
limited scope, purpose and duration. It is equally 
certain, however, that he may complain if the police 
break into his car and seize objects hidden in the 
trunk or glove compartment, even if the car is 
parked in a public lot, without probable cause and 
the existence of exigent circumstances. Yet the 
government's first premise would encompass just such 
condemned police action. 
Further, there is no way to protect against 
this type of intrusion once one leaves home and enters 
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the public streets. There is no way to lock a door 
or place the car under a protective cloak as a 
signal to the police that one considers the car 
private. 
Conceding the right of the agents to be in the 
parking lot next to the van, they had no right to 
attach the beacon without consent or judicial 
authorization. We are unwilling to hold that Holmes, 
and every other citizen, runs the risk that the 
government will plant a bug in his car in order to 
track his movements, merely because he drives his 
car in areas accessible to the public. The presence 
or absence of a physical intrusion into the interior 
of the car does not affect this conclusion. See 
Katz, supra." 
~ 
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SEARCH OF THE SHED 
"The district judge ordered suppression of the 
evidence seized from the Moody property on an 
alternative ground. He found, with ample evidentiary 
support, that the shed was within the curtilage and 
that agent Vipperman, in peering into its rear, 
trespassed on the curtilage. He ruled that this 
warrantless peering into the shed after trespassing 
was an unlawful search and seizure which did not fall 
within the "open fields" exception to the warrant 
requirement. See Hester v. United States, 1925, 265 
U.S. 57,44 S.Ct. 445, 68L.Ed. 898. In other words, 
he determined that the marijuana lying in the shed 
was not in "plain view", and ordered all evidence 
seized from the Moody property suppressed as "fruit". 
"Prior to entry upon the Moody land, the agents 
knew the general location of the van. It could have 
stopped on the Moody property, but it could as 
easily have stopped in the woods or near the church. 
For that matter, it could have stopped at any point 
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enroute from Gainesville to Federal Point to pick up 
the marijuana. No agent ever saw the van on the 
premises or saw signs of any activity, legal or 
illegal. At the time of entry, the agents also knew 
the van had been seized, so they could not have been 
looking for the van. Rather, they were looking 
solely for evidence of crime on little more than 
conjecture that the van had in fact stopped there to 
make its pickup. Agent Vipperman admitted that his 
sole purpose in getting close enough to peer into 
the hold in the shed was to look for marijuana. 
Implicit in this court's decisions in Davis and 
Brock is the finding that a home-owner has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his house and all 
within its curtilage. And explicitly, this court 
noted, in Davis, 423 F2d at 977, that "The high degree 
of judicial sanctity which the courts have accorded 
to dwellings is based upon the concept of privacy and 
the right to be left alone". See Brock, 223 F2d at 685, 
where the court stated that the police action there 
violated the homeowner's "right to be let alone"." 
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Included also in the appeal was the 'fruit of 
the poison tree' question. On this point the Court 
said: 
"The district judge found, with substantial 
evidentiary support, that the evidence was seized 
from the Moody property and the van as a direct 
product of the unlawful installation of the beeper. 
Without its aid, the agents would never have been 
directed to the Federal Point area, would not have 
discovered the Moody property, and would not have 
been in a position to intercept the van on its 
return. We agree with him that all the evidence 
seized was obtained by exploitation of the primary 
illegality, and was due to be suppressed." 
Convictions of the defendants were reversed. All 
evidence was found by police as a result of an unlaw-
ful search (use of a 'beeper') and was inadmissable 
as 'fruit of the poison tree' (Wong Sun, 9 Led 2d 455). 
NOTE: The Holmes ruling does not prohibit visual 
surveillance by police officers. 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK, Chapter 120: 
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that 
a delay of 23 months in bringing a DUI case to trial 
did not entitle the defendant to a reversal, because 
the delay was not caused by negligence on the part 
of prosecuting officers, but was because of delay 
caused by the defendant's motions for continuance. 
State v. Sarvis, SC, Op. No.20066, filed July 17, 1975. 
Sarvis also held that when a DUI suspect 
volunteers to take a blood test for alcohol at the 
hospital, the defendant is not entitled to either 
Miranda warnings or a warning that the blood test 
could be used against him in court. 
With respect to the defendant's argument that 
he was not afforded a speedy trial, the Court said: 
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"No demand was ever made by the respondent 
(defendant) for a trial, and according to the 
(Magistrate's) return, the delay in bringing the 
case to trial resulted from the indulgence of 
respondent's (defendant's) then attorney, so that 
he could attend to legislative matters, and not to 
neglect on the part of the State. 
"The continuance of the case in order to 
convenience respondent's (defendant's) counsel and 
the failure to demand a trial constituted a waiver 
of respondent's (defendant's) right to a speedy 
trial." 
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